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with	 a	 rich	 historical	 tradition	 takes	 the	 laws	 of	 logic	 to	 be	 laws	 of	
thought.	 Such	 an	 approach	 can	be	 found	 in	Kant’s	work,	 particular-
ly	Kant’s	 lectures	on	logic	and	his	Critique of Pure Reason	 (Kant,	1992,	
1998),	and	in	the	work	of	Boole	and	Frege.	In	the	case	of	Boole	(1854),	
the	clue	is	in	the	title	of	his	book:	An Investigation of The Laws of Thought 









thought,	but	rather	how it ought to proceed in thought.	(9:14,	
Kant,	1992:	529,	my	emphasis)
The	[laws	of	logic]	have	a	special	title	to	the	name	“laws	
of	 thought”	only	 if	we	mean	 to	assert	 that	 they	are	 the	
most	general	laws,	which	prescribe	universally	the way in 
which one ought to think if one is to think at all.	(Frege	1893,	
xv,	translation	by	Textor	2011,	20–21,	my	emphasis)
The	view	that	laws	of	logic	are	laws	of	thought	seems	intuitively	com-
pelling;	 after	 all,	 logic	 seems	 to	 be	 intimately	 related	with	 how	we	



















































2 Laws of Thought
Before	considering	what	a	 law	of	 thought	might	be,	 I	 should	clarify	
what	I	will	mean	by	‘thought’.	I	have	in	mind	a	conception	which	in-
cludes	something	as	minimal	as	‘entertaining	a	proposition’,	as	well	as	
more	 robust	 thoughts	 such	as	 ‘opining	 that	p’,	beliefs,	propositional	
knowledge,	drawing	inferences,	and	so	on.	The	core	idea	is	that	some	
propositional	 content	 should	 be	 involved.	 So,	 for	 example,	 cases	
which	are	not	obviously	propositional,	e. g.,	cases	of	mental	 imagery,	
or	trying	to	remember	a	melody,	will	count	as	cases	of	thinking	in	my	








There	 are	 three	 crucially	 different	ways	 one	might	 understand	 a	




















evidence	 is	 inconclusive.	 Alternatively,	 one	 might	 introduce	 a	 dis-
tinction	between	a	genuinely	 contradictory	 thought,	 that p&¬p,	 and	









However,	 the	problem	with	this	proposal	 is	 that	 it	still	 isn’t	clear	
how	 the	 thought	 that the proposition that p&¬p is contradictory	 could	
interact	appropriately,	as	part	of	a	 rational	process,	with	a	mistaken	




































Any	purported	 instance	of	 a	 thought	 that	p&¬p	will	 violate	 the	 law,	
and	hence	should	not	count	as	 thinking.	The	 implication	 is	 that	we	
cannot	even	entertain	propositions	with	such	a	contradictory	content,	
but	we	can.
First,	 one	 might	 appeal	 to	 anecdotal	 or	 introspective	 evidence:	
Doesn’t	Graham	Priest	 think	several	contradictions	before	breakfast?	








mative,	X	depends	 for	 its	normativity	on	something	else	external	 to	




How	 might	 it	 be	 that	 some	 principles	 are	 normative	 laws	 of	
thought?	 They	 might	 have	 extrinsic	 normativity,	 e. g.,	 if	 there	 were	
a	norm	directly	governing	 thought,	 to	aim	 for	 the	 truth,	and	 logical	
principles	served	that	aim	by	preserving	truth.	However,	this	kind	of	
















4.	 How	 exactly	 we	 should	 understand	 the	 intrinsic/extrinsic	 distinction	 is	 a	




means	to	reject	it.	It	may	be	that	the	thought	that the proposition that 
p&¬p is contradictory	can	interact	with	my	mistake	in	other	ways:	for	
example,	there	might	be	a	causal	link	between	this	thought	and	the	
subsequent	 loss	 of	 the	 contradictory	 pseudo-thought.	 But	 anything	
other	 than	 a	 logical	 relation	 between	 thoughts	 isn’t	 going	 to	 count	
as	a	rational,	logical	process	of	correction.	It	seems	plausible	that	we	
should	be	able	 to	correct	our	 logical	mistakes	 rationally and logically, 
not	due	to	other,	perhaps	merely	causal,	processes.	Hence	we	face	the	
problem	again,	 that	 to	 account	 for	our	 rational	 recognition	and	 cor-
rection	of	logical	mistakes,	we	need	to	be	able	to	think	contradictions.
We	 should	 not	 claim	 that	 contradictions	 are	 unthinkable,	 in	 the	
sense	 that	 we	 are	 literally	 not	 able	 to	 think	 them.2 In	 short,	 under-
standing	 laws	of	 thought	 as	 constitutive	will	 not	 provide	 a	 suitable	
account	of	laws	of	logic	as	laws	of	thought,	because	we	break	the	laws	
of	logic	all	the	time	when	thinking.




norm	 is	not	 followed,	 this	 is	 accompanied	by	a	notion	of	 somehow	
being	 incorrect	 or	wrong	 or	 liable for punishment.	 Likewise,	 following	
a	norm	is	deemed	as	being	correct	or	right	or	perhaps	 liable for praise.	
Some	object	or	phenomenon	is	normative	if	it	provides	reasons,	stan-







3.	 Sometimes	 normativity	 is	 also	 closely	 associated	 with	 value.	 In	 this	 pa-
per	I	will	use	only	the	sense	of	 ‘normativity’	which	implies	the	presence	of	

























is	 valid	 (in	a	 suasive	argument),	nevertheless,	Dummett	 claims	 that	
there	is	no	problem	for	using	a	rule	in	an	argument	which	is	intended	

















3 Logic and Rational Indubitability
3.1 A Logocentric Predicament?
Why	think	that	the	laws	of	logic	are	laws	of	thought?	The	strategy	of	
the	following	will	be	something	like	an	argument	to	the	best	explana-













with	the	laws	of	logic’.	Either	we ought to think in accordance with the laws, what-
ever they are,	where	the	laws	are	described	and	not	specified,	or	we ought to 
think in accordance with law L1, law L2, etc.,	where	the	laws	themselves	appear	
in	the	law	of	thought.	In	this	present	case,	I	mean	the	latter.	
6.	 Which	I	don’t.
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His	argument	is	based	on	the	idea	that,	if	part	of	what	it	is	to	under-
stand	 a	 logical	 constant	 is	 to	 accept	 certain	 principles	 of	 inference	
concerning	 that	 logical	constant,	 then	to	doubt	 these	principles	will	







that	 one	 cannot	 regard	 anything	which	 is	 recognisably	
an	instance	of	the	relevant	inference	pattern	as	unsound	













































basic	 logical	knowledge	and	 if	 there	 is,	how	 this	 is	possible”	 (2002:	
280),9 but	he	also	addresses	a	related	issue:	that	of	“explaining	why it 















of	 tonk-elimination	 is	 required	 for	understanding	 ‘tonk’,	
so	if	a	thinker	supposes	she	can	envisage	a	case	in	which	
it	would	be	true	that	A tonk B	but	not	true	that	B,	she	(too)	
must	be	confused.	But	 the	 tonk	rules	are	clearly	duff.	 It	
must,	therefore,	be	possible	to	entertain	doubts	—	indeed,	














that.	Of	course,	one	might	 just	doubt	with	brute	 force,	but	 then	the	










tional	 as	 (partially)	 constituted	by	 acceptance	 of	modus 




Is	 it	 reasonable	to	assume	such	a	restriction?	Surely	modus ponens	 is	
a	simple	inference	form,	blind	to	the	content	of	premises,	and	hence	
blind	to	the	logical	complexity	of	premises?	That	may	be	so,	but	Hale’s	
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general	 and	 conditional —	general,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 their	
explicit	 formulation	 tells	 us	 that	 a	 conclusion	 of	 some	
specified	 general	 form	 may	 be	 drawn	 from	 premises	





least	 if	 fully	 articulated,	 involve	 reasoning	 from	explicit	
formulations	of	the	rules	….	If	this	is	right,	then	there	is	
what	might	be	called	a	minimal kit	of	inference	rules	—	in-





logical	 constants	 in	 terms	 of	 (tacit)	 acceptance	 of	 certain	 inference	







to	 our	 understanding	 of	 logical	 constants.	 However,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	
that	 a	 commitment	 to	 this	 view	 of	 understanding	 is	 required.	 The	
understanding-constitutiveness	of	these	principles	rules	out	the	kind	
of	 doubt	 which	 is	 based	 on	 counterexamples:	 these	 would	 simply	










the	 conservativeness	 (or,	 more	 generally,	 the	 sound-




must	 be	 some	 rules	 whose	 reliability	 must,	 and	 may	
properly,	be	assumed	in	any	demonstration	we	can	give	
of	the	conservativeness	or	non-conservativeness	(more	
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reasoning from any supposition whatsoever.	If	we	can	show	that	there	are	
indeed	 some	modes	of	 inference	which	we	are	prepared	 to	employ	
in	reasoning	from	any	supposition	whatsoever,	then	we	will	thereby	
show	that	we	are	committed	to	the	belief	that	there	are	some	modes	
of	inference	that	will	preserve	truth no matter what else may be the case, 
which	will	 in	turn	amount	to	showing	that	we	are	committed	to	the	



























with	 reasoning	 about	 logic	will	 apply	 in	 any	 case.	 So	 the	 theory	 of	
understanding	need	not	play	as	great	a	role	here.	If,	however,	“doubt	




fail	 to	 involve	 at	 least	 some	of	 the	 distinctive	 features	 of	 reasoning	
about	 logic.	 So,	whilst	 I	 am	 sympathetic	 towards	Hale’s	 underlying	
commitment	 to	 an	 account	of	understanding	of	 logical	 constants,	 it	
does	not	look	like	such	a	commitment	is	required	to	get	hold	of	the	





3.3 McFetridge and Belief in Logical Necessity
A	lingering	doubt	 for	Hale’s	minimal	 toolkit	 remains:	he	himself	ad-
mits	 that	 it	 does	not	 conclusively	 establish	 that	 there	 is	 some	privi-












equates	 belief that a mode of inference is logically (absolutely) necessar-
ily truth-preserving with	preparedness to employ that mode of inference in 
	 jessica	leech Logic and the Laws of Thought
philosophers’	imprint	 –		10		– vol.	15,	no.	12	(march	2015)


















suppositions	 commit	us	 to	 a	belief	 that	 some	 rules	of	 inference	are	
truth-preserving	when	reasoning	under	any	supposition	whatsoever,	
whatever	may	be	 the	 case.	Hale	 (2002)’s	 argument	was	not	 able	 to	
show	conclusively	 that	 there	 are	 some	privileged	 rules	of	 inference,	
immune	from	rational	doubt	in	all	contexts,	although	it	was	strongly	
suggested.	McFetridge’s	argument	plugs	the	gap.














regard	 a	 rule	 of	 inference	 as	 logically	 necessarily	 truth-
preserving,	we	are	constrained	to	believe	that	there	are	
such	rules.	For	if	we	abandoned	that	belief,	we	would	be	
unable	 to	 reason	 from	 suppositions	 at	 all.	 (McFetridge,	
1990:	154)
Is	the	argument	successful?	Hale	(1999)	discusses	several	challenges.	
In	 particular,	 he	notes	 that	McFetridge	has	 assumed	 that,	 if	 one	be-
lieves	¬LN,	one	must	be	assured	in	any	case	of	reasoning	that	a	can-
























Let	 θ	 be	 some	 theory	we	 are	 putting	 to	 the	 test	 and	 L	





citrant	 (more	 fully,	 recalcitrant	with	respect	 to	θ+L)	 if	 it	
provides,	or	appears	to	provide,	grounds	to	accept	I	but	
reject	P.	(1999:	37)
In	 the	case	where	E	 is	 recalcitrant,	 the	Quinean	allows	a	number	of	
revisionary	moves.	One	might	change	theory	θ,	such	that	it	no	longer	
constitutes	premises	from	which	I→P	is	derivable.	One	might	change	
logic	L,	such	that	 it	no	 longer	yields	a	derivation	of	 I→P	 from	θ.	Or	
one	might	change	one’s	view	of	E,	such	that	it	is	no	longer	viewed	as	









Quinean	 will	 bring	 in	 pragmatic	 considerations,	 comparing	 the	 op-

















cess	of	belief-revision	will	 involve	 the	use	of	 logical	principles,	 and	
in	particular,	the	process	of	revision	of	logical	beliefs	will	involve	the	













of	 different	 changes).	 But	 if	 the	 very	 activities	 of	web-maintenance	
and	 belief-revision	 presuppose	 reliance	 on	 some	 logical	 principles,	
this	will	 cause	 trouble	when	 it	 comes	 to	 revision	of	beliefs	 in	 those	
16.	 See	in	particular	Shapiro	(2000:	338).




This	 echoes	 a	 point	which	 I	will	 attempt	 to	 draw	 out	 later,	 namely	
an	 important	distinction	between	our	attitudes	 towards	 rejection	or	
doubt	of	logical	truths,	and	those	towards	rejection	or	doubt	of	other	




isms,	 the	 second	a	 tribe	believing	 in	property-instances	 rather	 than	
objects,	 the	 third	 a	 tribe	believing	 in	 the	 existence	of	 parts	 but	not	
ontologically	robust	wholes.	We	might	find	some	of	these	worldviews	













3.5 The Minimal Principle of Contradiction
So	far	I	have	presented	some	arguments	for	the	claim	that	there	are	
some	principles	which	are	immune	to	rational	doubt,	but	I	have	not	









Since	all	 such	hypotheses	 are	 in	 the	 pragmatic	melting	
pot	 along	 with	 all	 other	 statements,	 we	 have	 no	 prog-
ress	—	only	regress.	(Hale,	1999:	39)
Such	arguments	show	that	a	Quinean	view	which	excludes	all	state-
ments,	 including	 logical	 statements,	 from	a	special	 status	outside	of	
the	web	of	belief,	cannot	be	sustained,	as	it	will	lead	to	vicious	regress.
Shapiro	highlights	an	additional	detail	of	Quine’s	view	which	pulls	
in	 the	 same	direction.	Quine’s	 thesis	 of	 the	 indeterminacy	of	mean-
ing	has	it	that	linguistic	behaviour	data	systematically	underdetermine	
an	interpretation	or	translation	of	a	linguistic	agent.	In	Quine’s	famil-
iar	example,	a	 linguist	 in	 the	field,	working	to	develop	a	 translation	
manual	for	the	language	of	a	tribe,	is	presented	with	a	tribe	member	
exclaiming	 “Gavagai!”	 in	 the	presence	of	 a	 rabbit.	Not	only	 is	 there	






Quine	 himself	 is	 ambivalent	 on	 the	 semantic	 status	 of	
the	logical	connectives.	In	later	work,	he	suggests	that	if	








































Thompson	 invites	us	 to	consider	a	 thought	experiment:	 Imagine	
trying	to	make	meaningful	utterances	in	a	situation	where	you	have	to	
accept	every	statement	as	true.	The	idea	is	that	such	a	thought	experi-
ment	 is	 self-undermining.	 In	order	 to	even	 imagine	such	a	scenario,	
one	must	be	adhering	to	the	minimal	principle	of	contradiction	by	de-
nying	the	truth	of	something,	namely	MPC.
[I]n	 imagining	 the	 situation	 in	 question,	 we	 presup-
pose	 the	 very	 principle	we	 are	 supposed	 to	 learn	 from	
the	 thought	 experiment.	 In	 order	 to	 imagine	 ourselves	
in	 a	 situation	 in	which	we	 reject	 the	minimal	principle	
of	 contradiction,	we	must	 take	 it	 to	be	 true	 that	 in	 this	
situation	we	reject	the	principle	and	false	that	we	accept	
it.	But	 then	we	 take	 for	granted	at	 the	 start	 that	not	ev-
ery	statement	 is	 true,	which	is	 just	what	the	experience	
is	 supposed	 to	 show.	 This	 predicament	 is	 unavoidable.	
(Thompson,	1981:	460)
Thompson’s	argument	here	 is	difficult	 to	 tease	out.	Moreover,	 there	
are	a	number	of	prima facie	problems.	E. g.,	imagination	is	not	closed	
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correctness	 in	 light	of	 the	 laws	of	physics.	 In	 this	sense,	
the	 laws	of	physics	provide	constitutive norms	 for	 the	ac-
tivity	of	thinking	about	the	physical	world.	(MacFarlane,	
2002:	36–37)

















rule	or	other.	 In	 this	case,	 it	was	most	natural	 to	 rely	on	 the	quanti-
fier	rules.	(At	least	they	are	different	to	the	principle	under	question:	














I	have	provided	a	number	of	 reasons	 to	 think	 that	 there	are	 logical	
principles	which	are	immune	to	rational	doubt.21 The	next	step	is	to	
give	 an	 explanation	 of	 this	 phenomenon.	 I	will	 first	 consider	 some	
candidate	explanations	which	fail.
First,	 I	will	 consider	MacFarlane’s	 interpretation	of	 Frege	on	 logi-
cal	laws.	Frege	primarily	takes	the	laws	of	logic	to	be	the	laws	of	truth.	
These	 are	 descriptive	 laws,	 general	 truths,	 where	 ‘general’	 means	






reasons	of	 space.	For	example,	an	 interesting	 link	might	be	drawn	here	 to	
Wittgenstein’s	hinge	propositions	(see	Wittgenstein	[1969]).




According	 to	 Frege,	 the	 laws	 of	 arithmetic	 govern	 all	 that	 is	 think-
























27.	 That	 a	 domain	 is	 ‘countable’	 is	 often	 understood	 as	meaning	 that	 the	 ele-
ments	of	 the	domain	can	be	mapped	one-one	 to	 the	natural	numbers.	But	
Frege	doesn’t	mean	to	claim	that	the	domain	of	all	things	is	countable.	(That	
would	be	false.	For	one,	not	every	point	on	a	line	can	be	counted	in	this	way,	
let	alone	everything	 there	 is.)	Rather,	Frege’s	 claim	 that	a	given	domain	 is	





ing	about	 something	out	of	 everything,	 there	 is	nothing	 left	 for	my	
thought	to	be	about.	
While	 physical	 laws	 provide	 constitutive	 norms	 for	











I	 am	 sympathetic	 to	 the	 view	 that	 laws	 of	 logic	 are	 constitutive	
norms	for	thought,	but	I	think	a	different	rationale	to	that	offered	by	
(MacFarlane’s)	Frege	is	to	be	preferred.	A	substantial	worry	about	this	








intended,	at	 least	 it	 is	a	Fregean	 view	under	consideration.	See	MacFarlane	
(2002)	and	Textor	(2011)	for	more	detailed	interpretations.
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Consider	 cases	 of	 purported	 “laws	 of	metaphysics”.	E. g.,	 Frege	may	
have	endorsed	something	like	the	following	statement:
Everything	is	either	an	object	or	a	function.











metaphysics	 is	 to	continually	question	 these	kinds	of	 statements,	 to	
consider	 them,	to	offer	arguments	and	justifications	 in	 favour	of	(or	
against)	them.
Recall,	the	brief	was	to	provide	an	explanation	of	a	particular	phe-
nomenon,	 namely	 the	 rational	 indubitability	 of	 some	 logical	 prin-






Another	 alternative	 explanation	might	 run	 as	 follows:	 Isn’t	 it	 be-
cause	we	want	our	thought	to	accord	with	how	things	are	absolutely	
necessarily?	 If	 thought	aims	at	 truth,	 then	thought	will	aim	at	being	
correct	about	how	things	are.	In	particular,	thought	will	always	count	






contains	 letters	which	act	as	place-holders	 for	 sentences	or	proposi-
tions.	So,	aren’t	the	laws	of	logic	a	specialized	science	about	proposi-




However,	 there	 are	other	 laws	 (general	 truths)	which	 are	 “about	
everything”	 and	which	 are	not	 rationally	 indubitable,	 or	 immune	 to	
rational	rejection,	or	otherwise	binding	on	our	thought.	If	this	expla-
nation	works	 for	 logical	 laws,	 then	any	other	 laws	which	constitute	
general	truths	about	everything	should	also	be	rationally	indubitable,	
and	yet	 they	 are	not.	One	 can	already	 see	 that	 the	 laws	of	 arithme-
tic,	on	this	view,	should	be	binding	for	thought	in	this	way.	Are	they?	
Maybe,	maybe	not.	More	worrying	is	the	possibility	of	general	truths	
which	 directly	 quantify	 over	 everything,	 or	which	 are	 “about	 every-
















5 Constitutive Norms for Thought
















The	primary	aim	of	 this	paper,	as	stated	at	 the	outset,	was	to	 for-








I	will	 start	with	 the	assumption	 that	 thought	 is	 a	normative	phe-
nomenon.	Take	an	example	of	representational	thought,	e. g.,	thinking	
that	a is F.	It	makes	sense	to	describe	how	this	representation	succeeds	











































norms	 to	 constitute	 thought	 as	 a	 normative	 phenomenon.	Thought	
in	 the	broadest	 sense	 is	 constituted	by	evaluability	 in	 light	of	 these	
general	logical	principles.
This	 line	of	 thought	needs	 to	be	 explored	more	 thoroughly	 else-




a	 starting	 point	 here.)	However,	 the	 suggestion	 to	 be	 kept	 in	mind	
is	that,	allowing	for	thoughts	which	fall	short	of	representing	the	ob-




































its	 possibility	 (whether	 by	 the	 testimony	 of	 experience	
from	 its	 actuality	 or	 a priori	 through	 reason).	 But	 I	 can	
think	whatever	I	like,	as	long	as	I	do	not	contradict	myself,	
i. e.,	 as	 long	as	my	concept	 is	 a	possible	 thought.	 (Kant,	
1998,	Bxxvi,	footnote,	emphasis	in	the	original)
Another	 example	 (which	 does	 not	 rely	 on	 Kant’s	 precarious	 views	





29.	 In	 this	case,	 it	 is	 incompatible	with	 the	Euclidean	 laws	of	geometry,	which	
Kant	thought	were	necessary	conditions	of	our	experience	of	things	in	space.



















For	 example,	 Hobson	 (1999)	 claims	 that	 events	 within	 dreams	
are	 not	 subject	 to	 reasons,	 and	 that	 dreamers	 are	 in	 a	 non-rational	
state,	although	he	shies	away	from	allowing	that	one	could	dream	“an	
evident	 contradiction”,	 on	pain	 of	 disrupting	 the	flow	of	 the	dream-
narrative:	“In	a	word,	the	limits	of	dream	content	are	the	same	as	the	
limits	 of	 dream	narratability”	 (Hobson,	 1999:	 410).	However,	 if	Gra-







31.	 For	 example:	 “I	walk	out	 of	 the	 room;	 for	 an	 instant,	 I	 am	 symmetrically	
poised,	one	foot	in,	one	foot	out,	my	center	of	gravity	lying	on	the	vertical	
plane	 containing	 the	 center	 of	 gravity	 of	 the	door.	Am	 I	 in	 or	 not	 in	 the	
room?	By	 symmetry,	 I	 am	neither	 in	 rather	 than	not	 in,	nor	not	 in	 rather	
than	in	….	But	wait	a	minute.	If	I	am	neither	in	nor	not	in,	then	I	am	not	(in)	
and	not	(not	in).	But	the	law	of	double	negation,	I	am	both	in	and	not	in.	
For	Kant,	 the	generality	of	 logical	 laws	consists	 in	 their	
abstraction	 from	 the	 content	 of	 judgments,	 while	 for	




scendental	 logic	 (Kant,	 1998,	A50–57/B74–82).	Transcendental	 logic	
comprises	rules	for	the	special	employment	of	the	understanding	to	
thoughts	 and	 judgments	 about	 objects	 of	 possible	 experience,	 i. e.,	
objects	that	conform	to	the	conditions	under	which	the	human	mind	
is	able	to	have	objective	representational	thoughts	and	empirical	ex-




rules	 for	 thought	as	 such.	Recall,	 the	main	problem	 for	 the	Fregean	
view	was	that	the	laws	of	logic	are	not	the	only	truths	which	are	about	
everything.	But	perhaps	this	is	simply	the	wrong	way	to	think	of	the	
generality	 of	 logic.	 The	 Kantian	 account	 of	 generality	 distinguishes	
logical	laws	as	abstracting	away	from	all	content,	and	therefore	avoids	
this	kind	of	problem.






First,	 consider	 dreaming.	 We	 do	 not	 demand	 logical	 coherence	
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are	 that	 they	 are	professed	 to	be	 arational	 and	automatic.	They	 are	
arational,	not	directly	subject	 to	 rational	norms,34 rather	 than	 irratio-
nal,	 in	violation	of	 rational	norms:	 “Though	aliefs	may	be	useful	or	
detrimental,	 laudable	or	 contemptible,	 they	are	neither	 rational	nor	













these	 key	 features,	 then	we	 have	 another	 plausible	 candidate	 for	 a	
mental	state	which	is	both	not	a	kind	of	thinking,	and	also	not	subject	
to	logical	laws.
A	more	 troublesome	 case	might	 be	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 stream	 of	 con-




not	even	 involve	 something	as	well-formed	as	a	proposition,	 e. g.,	 a	
sub-propositional	“fragment”.





35.	 I	have	 taken	 this	way	of	presenting	 the	content	of	alief	 from	Mandelbaum	
(2013).
dream,	the	point	is	that,	if	we	do	dream	explicit	contradictions,	they	
don’t	 count	 as	 “incorrect”.	 Similarly,	 Macdonald	 (1953)	 describes	











and	wholly	 composed	of	dragon	flesh,	where	 these	are	different,	 al-
though	I	will	be	very	confused	on	waking.32













32.	Note	that	the	proposition	that	the dragon is wholly composed of marshmallows 
and wholly composed of something other than marshmallows,	 although	 contra-










our	 practices	 of	 reasoning	 and	 justification.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	we	
want	 to	maintain	 that	 basic	 principles	 and	 statements	 arising	 from	
logic	are,	above	all,	true.	A	view	which	takes	laws	of	logic	to	be	consti-
tutive-normative	laws	of	thought	has	a	ready	answer	to	the	first	ques-
tion,	 but	has	no	 immediate	 answer	 to	 the	 second.	Likewise,	 a	 view	
which	 takes	 laws	of	 logic	 to	be	 connected	 to	 something	external	 to	
thought	may	have	it	easier	with	the	second	question,	but	will	struggle	
with	the	first.
A	 natural	move	 to	make,	 given	 the	Kantian	 background	 of	 this	













































laws	of	truth:	above	all,	these	are	themselves	truths.	How things are ab-
solutely necessarily	is	also	understood	to	be	how things are.	By	contrast,	
it	is	not	clear	how	the	proposed	view,	that	laws	of	logic	are	constitu-




and	the	 implication	of	 truth	by	 logical	necessity,	would	be	an	unac-
ceptable	cost.
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agency,	and	issue	(b)	can	be	addressed	by	noting	the	constitutive	tie.	






as a car,	good,	that	is,	 in	measuring	up	to	the	standards	a	
commitment	 to	which	 is	built	 into	 the	very	classification	
of	an	object	as	a	car.	Analogously,	then,	perhaps	in	order	








The	 analogy	with	my	 proposed	 view	 of	 logical	 laws	 is	 striking.	My	











39.	Examples	 of	 constitutive	 views	 include	 Korsgaard	 (1996,	 2009)	 and	 Rosati	
(2003).
explanations	 of	 this.	 One	might	 run	 a	 transcendental	 idealist,	 con-
structivist	 story,	 and	claim	 that	 certain	 features	of	 the	world	are	 in-
jected	 into	 the	world	 through	our	cognitive	engagement	with	 it;	 in	
constructing	 a	world	 of	 experience	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 laws	 of	





termine	which	parts	of	 the	world	we	are	able	 to	 think	of	and	expe-
rience.	The	things	we	can	think	of	correctly	are	real,	and	genuinely	
conform	to	the	laws	of	thought,	although	there	might	be	other	things	
lurking	beyond	our	ken.	Call	 this	 the	shape-sorter	view	of	 the	 laws	
of	thought.	In	either	case,	the	resulting	objects	of	thought	genuinely	
do	conform	to	the	laws	of	thought	—	the	laws	of	thought	are	true	of	
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is	also	 the	worry	 that	 the	constitutive	element	of	 the	view	 is	equally	
undermining.	Second,	just	as	we	require	a	reason	to	be	an	agent	rather	
than	a	schmagent,	so	it	seems	we	need	to	explain	why	we	should	be	




























































above	 that	 if	we	understand	 logical	 laws	 in	a	normative	way	we	can-
not	expect	 the	 resulting	 logical	necessities	 to	 imply	 truth,	but	 there	
40.	We	want	them	to	be	true	and/or	truth-preserving.





without	 cognitive	 or	 practical	 norms	 of	 any	 kind.	With-







































but	 instead	 by	 simply	 opting out	 of	 the	 social	 construct	
that	 constitutes	 the	will	 to	 truth:	 that	 is,	by	deciding	 to	
















anything	 to	 them,	or	untruth	or	untruthfulness	 for	 that	
















very	 idea	of	 logic	has	come	out	of	 the	 study	of	 reasoning	and	valid	










assert	that if p, then q,	if	this	doesn’t	mean	that	whenever	you’ve	got	p,	
you’ve	also	got	q?	If	your	conditional	is	more	complex	than	this,	such	
that	modus ponens	is	not	sufficient	for	conditional-elimination,	at	least	




























constitutive-normative	 laws	of	 thought	can	accommodate	 the	appar-
ent	plurality	of	different	logics.
One	option	would	be	to	restrict	the	proposed	account	to	basic,	core	
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in	 a	mental	 activity	which	 is	 evaluable	 in	 light	of	 certain	principles	
explains	why	we	can’t	shake	off	logic,	although	we	can	nevertheless	
make	logical	mistakes.	Finally,	I	have	considered	some	objections	to	
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